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Abstract: In place of the just-so stories and intuition mongering
of analytical metaphysicians, I o¤er a program for understanding
the relationship between credence and chance in quantum physics
and show how a version of the program can be implemented with
some representation theorems.
1 Introduction: a short, depressing history
of the Principal Principle
Some forty years ago David Lewis (1980) proposed a principle, dubbed the
Principal Principle (PP), connecting rational credence and chance. A crude
example that requires much rening is nevertheless helpful in conveying the
intuitive idea. Imagine that you are observing a coin ipping experiment.
Suppose that you learn for the nonce never mind how that the objective
chance of Heads on the next ip is 1/2. PP asserts that rationality demands
that when you update your credence function on said information your degree
of belief in Heads-on-the-next-ip should equal 1/2, and this is so regardless
of other information you may have about the coin, such as that on the 100
ips you have observed so far 72 of the outcomes resulted in Tails.
The large and ever expanding philosophical literature that has grown up
around the PP exhibits a number of curious, disturbing, and sometimes jaw
dropping features.1 To begin, there is a failure to engage with the thresh-
old issue of whether there is a legitimate subject matter to be investigated.
Bruno de Finettis (1990, p. x) bombastic pronouncement that THERE
1Here is a sample that conveys the avor the literature: Arntzenius and Hall (2003);
Bigelow, Collins, and Pargeter (1993); Black (1998); Haddock (2011); Hall (1994, 2004);
Ismael (2008); Meacham (2010); Pettigrew (2012); Roberts (2001, 2013); Strevens (1995);
Thau (1994); Vranus (2002, 2004).
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IS NO PROBABILITY was his way of asserting that there is no objec-
tive chance, only subjective or personal degrees of belief, and hence there
is no need to try to build a bridge connecting credence to a mythical en-
tity. Leaving doctrinaire subjectivism aside for the moment and assuming
there is objective chance brings us to the next curious feature of the lit-
erature: the failure to engage with substantive theories of chance, despite
the fact that various fundamental theories of modern physics in particular,
quantum theory ostensively speak of objective chance. Of course, as soon
as one utters this complaint the de Finetti issue resurfaces since interpre-
tive principles are needed to tease a theory of chance from a textbook on a
theory of physics, and de Finettis heirs the self-styled quantum Bayesians
(QBians) maintain that the probability statements that the quantum the-
ory provide are to be given a personalistic interpretation.2 And this leads
to the next curious and disturbing feature of the literature. The bulk of
the philosophical discussion is couched in terms of classical probability the-
ory, without any apparent recognition of the facts that quantum probability
theory is not classical probability theory and that the way in which quan-
tum probabilities are generated o¤ers ways of linking credence and chance
that have a bearing on PP. The lack of engagement with substantive theo-
ries of chance also enables the avoidance in the philosophical literature with
the issue of whether and how it is possible learn what the objective chances
are. Lacking an account of how the learning of chances is possible, the
PP has the airy-fairy quality of a Principle of Revelation that requires that
when a rational agent acquires knowledge of the god El Qannas favorability
ranking never mind how she acquires it she aligns her credence in X with
how favorably El Qanna looks upon X.
If this parade of horribles were not already long enough there is another
overriding concern: a lack of clarity about what the PP is. I refer not just
to the fact that there are several competing formulations of PP but to the
more fundamental fact that there is an ambiguity in what is being claimed
by any given formulation. To lay out this complaint in more detail a little
more groundwork is helpful.
The vicissitudes of PP are best discussed in the setting of what I will
call normative Bayesianism. There are two forms classical and quantum
that take into account the di¤erences in the event structures of classical and
quantum settings. There are two matching tenets from the two forms involv-
2For an accessible introduction to QBism see von Baeyer (2016).
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ing, respectively, synchronic and diachronic constraints on rational degrees
of belief. The synchronic constraint requires that rational degrees of belief
conform to the probability axioms classical or quantum as the case may be.
The diachronic constraint requires that updating proceeds in the classical
case by Bayes conditionalization and in the quantum case by Lüders condi-
tonalization. In both cases the diachronic constraint is silent about how an
agent should update on zero-probabilty events, an issue that will be set aside
here.3
The rst way of construing PP is that it is proposing an additional con-
straint on rational credence. It contemplates that there are credence func-
tions that satisfy the tenets of normative Bayesianism but fail to align with
objective chance when knowledge of its values is obtained, and it would label
such credence functions as irrational despite their Bayesian pedigree. Al-
leged norms require justication. There are multiple justications for the
synchronic norm of Bayesianism: Dutch book arguments, scoring rule ar-
guments, decision theoretic arguments, and more. The justication for the
diachronic constraint is much thinner. As far as I am aware the only half-way
convincing argument involves a diachronic Dutch book construction that has
been subjected to much criticism. But for present purposes the diachronic
constraint can be taken on board since what is at issue is whether there needs
to be a further constraint linking credence and chance. If PP is to serve as
an additional normative constraint it requires justication. The only serious
attempt to this e¤ect I am aware of is a scoring rule argument (see Pettigrew
2012). It gets credit for ingenuity, but it is question begging. The scoring
is given in terms of a measure of how well personal degree of belief tracks
objective chance. But precisely what is at issue is how and why rational
credence should track objective chance.
The second way to construe PP is to take it not as proposing a new princi-
ple of rationality but rather as providing a kind of functional characterization
of chance: whatever chance turns out to be, it is that which has the power
to command credence in the way PP contemplates. This point of view can
serve as a useful heuristic when trying to interpret a physical theory so as to
yield verdicts about objective chance. But adamantly refusing to apply the
label chanceunless it ts the functional characterization provided by PP
turns PP into prophecy that will either be empty or self-fullling.
Time to pack it in? Not yet. Another line of investigation is worth pur-
3See Earman (2020) for a discussion of this issue in classical and quantum probability.
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suing: it seeks to give a more constructive content to the idea that objective
chance is that which commands rational credence.
2 The program
The program starts from the sentiment that questions about the relation of
credence and chance should be relativized to a substantive theory of chance,
and it is open to the possibility that the answers may vary from theory to
theory. It is up front in admitting that a theory of chance cannot be read o¤
a textbook theory of physics but requires interpretational principles. Such
principles are bound to be controversial what did you expect! But the
controversies will be of a form that is part and parcel of the philosophy of
physics, and reducing issues about PP to such a form is to be counted as
progress. The goal of the program is to prove theorems about how rational
credence is related to chance as embodied in the considered theory of chance.
Taking to heart the pessimism about justifying PP as a new principle of
rationality, the program takes rational credenceto mean simply credence
satisfying the two norms of normative Bayesianism no additional norms are
to be appealed to. Then the chips are left to fall where they may. If some of
the theorems can be plausibly construed as fullling the intuition that David
Lewis had, score one a big one for David. But dont celebrate too much
unless the considered theory of chance lends itself to an account of how agents
can come to learn what the chances are. On the other hand, if no appropriate
theorems are forthcoming then conclude that, as far as the considered theory
of chance is concerned, the PP is to be put in the litter bin of untenable
philosophical conceits. But continue the program by investigating how PP
fares in alternative substantive theories of chance.
What kind of theorem should we hope to prove if such a program is to lead
to a vindication of the PP? Here I take my inspiration from two sources. The
rst is the theory of rational decision making under uncertainty, where the
goal is to prove a representation theorem of the form: If an agents preferences
satisfy such-and-such rationality constraints then they can be represented as
if she has a utility function and a probability function such that her decisions
conform to the rule of maximizing expected utility. Second, I take to heart
Jenann Ismaels (2008) insight that behind squabbles about specic formu-
lations of the PP there is the more general principle that rational credence
is, or as I would prefer to say, can be represented as subjective uncertainty
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about what the objective chances are. This generalized PP explains why
achieving subjective certainty about the objective chances brings credences
into line with (what the agent takes to be) chance.
With these guidelines in mind, the desired theorem should take the form
of a representation theorem: Rational credence in an event E can be rep-
resented as a weighted average of the possible objective chances, where the
weight given to a chance value is the agents personal probability of the
proposition that the chance takes the specied value. Again rational cre-
dence is to mean simply credence satisfying the two norms of normative
Bayesianism, and the representation theorem can be either an object level
theorem or a meta-theorem of the considered theory of chance. The theorem
should entail as a corollary that when updated on F (by Bayes conditional-
ization in the case of classical probability or by Lüders conditonalization in
the case of quantum probability) the agents new rational credence in E can
again be represented as a weighted average of the possible objective chances,
where now the weight given to a chance value is agents F -updated personal
probability assigned to the proposition that the chance takes the specied
value. And from this it should follow that updating on the proposition that
the chances are so-and-so brings the agents credence of an event E into align-
ment with said chance of E. Obviously, in order to enable the sought after
representation theorem the considered theory of chance must contain propo-
sitions, in the domain of both credence functions and chance functions, that
can play the contemplated role in the weighting of chances by the subjective
credences assigned to the corresponding propositions. This is something that
needs to be demonstrated, not assumed.
One potential glitch in implementing this program is an ambiguity in
the synchronic norm of normative Bayesianism that went unremarked above.
The additivity axiom for probabilities, classical or quantum, comes in dif-
ferent strengths nite, countable, and complete additivity and the di¤er-
ent justications for the synchronic norm mentioned above support di¤erent
strengths of additivity. My tactic here is admittedly self-serving: use what-
ever strength of additivity is needed to get a representation theorem and
then afterwards revisit the issue of how the needed form of additivity can be
justied as a constraint on rational credence.
As an illustration of how the program can be implemented in the quantum
context I will propose an account of how chance works in ordinary QM and
show how it enables a representation theorem of the desired form. Before
turning to this account it will be helpful consider in more detail what the
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philosophical literature would lead us to expect by way of a representation
theorem.
3 The PP of philosophersdreams
Philosophers who write about credence and chance in the classical setting
use expressions like ch() to stand for a chance function that assigns
chances to propositions in its domain, and expressions like Cch to stand for
the proposition that the chances are given by the chance function ch().
Presumably Cch and Cch0 are to be regarded as logically incompatible when
ch 6= ch0. In this notation the special PP would require that
If Cr is a rational credence function then for any chance function
ch such that Cr(Cch) 6= 0
Cr(E=Cch) = ch(E) (SPP)
where E is any proposition in the domain of both the credence
function Cr and the chance functions, and = denotes Bayes
conditionalization (i.e. Cr(E=F ) =
Cr(EF )
Cr(F )
), provided that
Cr(F ) 6= 0.)
Note that (SPP) requires that rational credence functions have the same
additivity prole as chance functions. So if some chance functions are merely
nitely additive while others are countably additive, or some are merely
countably additive while others are completely additive, then no rational
agent can satisfy (SPP) unless she denies chance by setting Cr(Cch) = 0 for
all ch, thereby satisfying (SPP) vacuously.4 So unless some explanation is
forthcoming as to why all chance functions have the same additivity prole,
(SPP) is a non-starter.
Using the same notation, Ismaels general PP for representing credence
as epistemic uncertainty about objective chance would take the form
4And even here there is a problem. If the disjunction of the Cch over all chance functions
is a proposition in the domain of Cr then (SPP) implies that a rational credence function
cannot be completely additive.
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If Cr is a rational credence function then
Cr(E) =
P
fchg
ch(E)Cr(Cch) (GPP)P
fchg
Cr(Cch) = 1 and Cr(CchCch0) = 0 when ch 6= ch0
where the sum is taken over the class fchg of all chance functions.
Since presumably the Bayes updated credence functionCr(=F ), whereCr(F ) 6=
0, is rational if Cr is, we should have from (GPP) that
Cr(E=F ) =
P
fchg
ch(E)Cr(Cch=F ).
And for F = Cch for some particular chance function ch we get back the
(SPP): Cr(E=Cch) = ch(E) when Cr(Cch) 6= 0.
I emphasize that (GPP) is simply hypothesized or imposed as a ratio-
nality constraint, and as far as I am aware there is no attempt to prove a
representation theorem of the form (GPP) from a theory of classical chance.
The optimistic agenda is now set for understanding the relation between
credence and quantum chance: Produce an account of quantum chance that
yields analogs of (SPP) and (GPP) as theorems for credence functions sat-
isfying the norms of normative Bayesianism. The account should explain
how it is possible to learn what the chances are, and should also explain
why all chances satisfy the same form of additivity. Due to the di¤erence
in the event structure for classical and quantum events it would be surpris-
ing if this agenda could be attained in a completely straightforward manner.
What we will nd is that while there is a straightforward quantum analog
of (SPP), the quantum analog of (GPP) has to be more nuanced due to
the non-commutative nature of quantum events; specically, there are many
ways to parse quantum chances, and while there is always a way that yields
a direct analog of the classical (GPP), in general the representation of cre-
dence as epistemic uncertainty about quantum chance contains an additional
non-classical term that embodies quantum interference e¤ects.
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4 Proof of concept
The account I will o¤er of how chance works in ordinary QM is, I think,
plausible. I will not attempt to defend it because it is on o¤er only as an
illustration of how it is at least plausible that the program outlined above
can be carried to fruition.
4.1 Sketch of the account of quantum chance for ordi-
nary QM.
The algebra of observables isB(H), the von Neumann algebra of all bounded
operators acting on the Hilbert space H. The events or propositions to
which probabilities are assigned are members of P(B(H)), the projection
lattice of B(H).5 Quantum probability theory is then viewed as the study of
quantum probability measure on P(B(H)) where such a measure is a map
Pr : P(B(H)) ! [0; 1] such that Pr(I) = 1 and Pr(E1 _ E2) = Pr(E1) +
Pr(E2) when E1; E2 2 P(B(H)) are mutually orthogonal.6
Quantum states are normed positive linear functionals on B(H). Any
such state ! induces on P(B(H)) a quantum probability measure Pr!(E) :=
!(E) for any E 2 P(B(H)). I adopt the widely shared attitude that the
physically realizable states are the normal states, i.e. those with a density
operator representation. A vector state is a state  such that there is a unit
vector j i 2 H with !(A) = h jAj i for all A 2 B(H). A mixed (or impure)
state is a state is state ! that can be expressed as a convex linear combination
of other states, viz. ! = 11 + 22 with 0 < 1; 2 < 1, 1 + 2 = 1, and
1 6= 2. A pure state is a non-mixed state, and for B(H) the normal pure
states coincide with the vector states.
The key interpretational principle used here is that the probability mea-
sure induced by a normal pure state gives the chances for events in P(B(H))
when the system at issue is in said state. The support projection for a nor-
mal pure state S 2 P(B(H)) serves as the proposition that the chances are
those induced by  .7
5An element E 2 P(B(H)) is a self-adjoint operator such that E2 = I (the identity
operator). In the literature projections are referred to as Yes-No questions as well as events
or propositions.
6For details see Hamhalter (2003). When E1; E2 2 P(B(H)) are mutually orthogonal
E1 _ E2 = E1 + E2.
7The support projection S of a normal state  is the smallest projection to which  
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Updating is done by Lüders conditionalization, denoted by ==to distin-
guish it from Bayes conditionalization. It is dened for a quantum probabil-
ity measure Pr on P(B(H)) that extends to a state ! on B(H), in which
case Pr(E==F ) :=
!(FEF )
!(F )
=
!(FEF )
Pr(F )
for all E;F 2 P(B(H)) such that
!(F ) 6= 0. When E and F commute Lüders conditionalization reduced to
Bayes conditionalization since then FEF = EF 2 = EF and Pr(E==F ) =
Pr(EF )
Pr(F )
. The case for Lüders conditionalization as the proper analog of
Bayesconditionalization for a non-abelian algebra is strong and will not be
reviewed here (see Bub 1977 and Cassinelli and Zanghi 1983).
There is a fairly strong case for the assumption that physically realizable
states must be normal (see Ruetsche 2011 and Earman and Ruetsche 2020).
If this assumption is taken on board it explains why all chances have the
same additivity prole; for any normal state on B(H) induces on P(B(H))
a probability measure that is completely additive.8 Complete additivity re-
duces to nite additivity when dim(H) is nite and to countably additivity
if dim(H) = 1 and H is separable. The further assumption that only pure
normal states induce chances will be addressed below in Section 5.
All the ingredients needed to give a proof of concept in the form of a
representation theorem for quantum chances are in place. In fact I will o¤er
two.
4.2 Representation theorems.
For the classical (GPP) the sum that represents an agents credence Cr(E) in
E as an epistemically weighted average
P
fchg
ch(E)Cr(Cch) of possible chances
of E is taken over the entire class fchg of classical chance functions since the
Cch are logically incompatible and all of these mutually exclusive possibil-
assigns probability 1. For a normal pure state (= vector state) the support projection is
the projection onto the ray spanned by the unit vector corresponding to  .
8The complete additivity of a quantum probability measure on P(B(H)) means that
Pr(
P
a
Ea) =
P
a
Pr(Ea) for any family fEag of mutually orthogonal projections. When the
sum
P
a
Pr(Ea) is over an uncountable index set I, as can occur when the Hilbert space is
non-separable, it is understood as limF
P
a2F Pr(Ea) where the F are nite subsets of I,
and limF
P
a2F Pr(Ea) = L means that for any  > 0 there is a nite F0  I such that
for any nite F with I  F  F0, j
P
a2F Pr(Ea)  Lj < .
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ities have to be taken into account for an accurate representation. In the
quantum case it would make no sense to sum over all possible chance making
states (= normal pure states). The closest analog would be a sum over a
set f ag of chance-inducing normal pure states whose support projections
fS ag form a partition of P(B(H)); specically, S aS a0 = O (orthogonality
of the di¤erent support projections) and
P
a
S a = I (completeness). The
orthogonality of the S a is the closest quantum analog of the logical incom-
patibility of the Cch. There is a di¤erent sense of incompatibility in QM that
has no classical analog and, as will be discussed below in Sec. 5.3, this is
responsible for the fact that there is a non-trivial sense of transition proba-
bility quantum probability for non-orthogonal states that has no counterpart
in classical probability.
The rst representation theorem shows that, with a mild restriction on
the Hilbert space, there always exists a privileged partition fS ag that apes
as closely as possible the (GPP) of classical probability.
Theorem 1. Let Pr be a completely additive quantum probability
measure on the projection lattice P(B(H)) where dim(H)  3.
Then there exists a countable set f ag of mutually orthogonal
normal pure states on B(H) such that for all E 2 P(B(H))
Pr(E) =
P
a
 a(E) Pr(S a) (QGPP)P
a
Pr(S a) = 1, Pr(S aS a0 ) = 0 for a 6= a0,
P
a
S a = I
where S a 2 P(B(H)) is the support projection for  a.
Proof: The proof of the theorem is an easy consequence of combining Glea-
sons theorem with Theorem 7.1.12 of Kadison and Ringrose (1997). For a
Pr satisfying the conditions of the Theorem, Gleasons theorem shows that
Pr extends uniquely to a normal state ! on B(H).9 For B(H) the nor-
mal pure states are vector states, and the Kadison and Ringrose theorem
9Gleasons theorem was originally proved for separable H and countably additive Pr. It
has been extended to: If H is a Hilbert space, separable or non-separable, dim(H)  3, and
Pr is a completely additive quantum probability measure on P(B(H)) then Pr extends to
a unique normal state on B(H). And it has been further extended to include more general
von Neumann algebras.
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shows that for any normal state and, thus, for the state ! in question
there is a countable family f ag of normal pure states (= vector states
on B(H)) whose corresponding unit vectors fj aig are mutually orthogo-
nal such that ! =
P
a
a a, where the limit is understood in the sense of
norm convergence and where
P
a
a = 1 and 0 < a < 1. Since  a0(S a) = 0
for a0 6= a, we have !(S a0 ) = a0 and, thus, !(A) =
P
a
!(S a) a(A) for
A 2 B(H). Since !(S a) = Pr(S a) and !(E) = Pr(E) for E 2 P(B(H))
we have Pr(E) =
P
a
 a(E) Pr(S a). Finally,
P
a
Pr(S a) =
P
a
a = 1;
Pr(S aS a0 ) = 0 for a 6= a0 since S aS a0 is the null projection; and without
loss of generality the fj aig can be expanded if necessary to form a complete
ON basis so that
P
a
S a = I.
When H is non-separable there is an uncountable number of mutually or-
thogonal normal pure states. Why then is the representation theorem able
to get away with summing over a countable subset? The short answer is that
a non-zero probability can be assigned to only a countable number of the
members of the uncountable set fS ag of support projections.
If the Pr of Theorem 1 interpreted as the credence function of a Bayesian
agent who assigns degrees of belief to the elements of P(B(H)) and nothing
in the formal apparatus prevents such an interpretation then apart from the
restriction dim(H)  3 this theorem fullls the wish list of expectations for a
representation theorem that vindicates the present construal of PP for QM.
It remains to discuss how an agent can learn what the quantum chances are.
The short answer is that, in principle, she can do a Yes-No experiment for the
support projection S for a normal pure state state  . If she perceives a Yes
answer she can be (subjectively) certain that the chances are those induced
by  . The need for the restriction to dim(H)  3 and the di¢ culty this
poses for for quantum Principal Principle for dim(H) = 2 will be discussed
in Sec. 5. below.
To explore the di¤erences in the relation between credence and chance in
the classical vs. quantum cases, call a family f ag of mutually orthogonal
normal pure states amenable to a quantum probability Pr if it instantiates
(QGPP) for Pr. In general, di¤erent quantum probability functions, encod-
ing the credences of di¤erent rational agents, have di¤erent amenable fam-
ilies. Similarly, the family f ag of mutually orthogonal normal pure states
amenable to Pr encoding an agents initial credences in quantum events may
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not be amenable to that agents Lüders updated Pr(==F ) credences for
an F 2 P(B(H)) such that Pr(F ) 6= 0. The updated Pr(==F ) has an
amenable family f bg, but this may not be the same as the family f ag that
is amenable to the initial Pr.
Further di¤erences with the classical case emerge from asking how the
credences of an agent are related to chances when those chances are not
amenable to the agents credence function. The answer is given by the fol-
lowing version of the quantum general PP:
Theorem 2. Let Pr be a completely additive quantum probability
measure on the projection lattice P(B(H)) where dim(H)  3. If
fj'aig is an arbitrary ON basis for H with corresponding normal
states f'ag and support projections fS'ag then
Pr(E) =
P
a
'a(E) Pr(S'a) (QGPP
0)
+
X
b 6=c
!(S'bES'c)
for all E 2 P(B(H)), where ! is the normal state that extends
Pr to B(H).
Proof: By Gleasons theorem Pr extends uniquely to a normal state ! on
B(H). Use the fact thatP
a
S'a = I and, thus, !(E) = !((
P
a
S'a)E(
P
b
S'b)).
From the normality and linearity of ! it follows that !((
P
a
S'a)E(
P
b
S'b)) =P
a
!(S'aES'a)+
P
b 6=c
!(S'bES'c). Since !(S'aES'a) = 0 when !(S'a) = 0
any such terms can be left out of the rst sum, and for each of the remaining
terms in this sum !(S'aES'a) =
!(S'aES'a)
!(S'a)
!(S'a). Next use the lter
property of the support projection S for a normal pure state  , viz. if !
is any normal state such that !(S ) 6= 0 then !(S AS )
!(S )
=  (A) for all
A 2 B(H) (see Earman and Ruetsche 2020). By the lter property of the
S'a,
!(S'aES'a)
!(S'a)
= 'a(E), and together with !(S'a) = Pr(S'a) this givesP
a
!(S'aES'a) =
P
a
'a(E) Pr(S'a). Collecting these results yields (QGPP
0).
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Thus, for an arbitrary way of partitioning quantum chance-making nor-
mal pure states into mutually orthogonal and exhaustive family f'ag, the cre-
dence Pr(E) in E is represented as a sum of two terms: a sum over the possi-
ble objective chances 'a(E) ofE weighted by their respective subjective prob-
abilities Pr(S'a), plus a term that can be interpreted as a kind of interference
between the chances. Note that the !(S'bES'c) terms on the rhs of (QGPP
0)
cannot in general be written as Pr(S'bES'c) since (S'bES'c) =2 P(B(H))
when the projections do not commute. (QGPP0) reduces to (QGPP) when
the basis fj'aig is amenable to Pr. That there always is an amenable basis
follows from Theorem 1. The basis is amenable when the density operator
corresponding to the normal state ! extending Pr diagonalizes in the ba-
sis fj'aig and, consequently, the !(S'bES'c) terms vanish. And, of course,
(QGPP0), reduces to (QGPP) when the algebra is classical (= abelian) since
then the
P
b 6=c
!(S'bES'c) term vanishes for any mutually orthogonal family
f'ag.
The more complicated Theorem 2 form of the quantum general PPmay be
viewed as a drawback, but on the other hand there would be something very
suspicious if the non-abelian nature of quantum events did not make itself
felt in the relation between credence and quantum chance. To appreciate
this point the reader is invited to do the following exercise. Analyze the two
slit experiment using classical probability and Bayes conditioning to get an
expression for the probability of a hit in some region of the screen when both
slits are open. The classical prediction is just the sum of what one would
expect when the left slit only is open, plus what would expect when right slit
only is open. This, of course, is not what the experiment yields. Now repeat
the probability calculation using Lüders conditioning in place of Bayes. One
gets an analog of the classical prediction plus an extra !-term of a similar
form as in representation Theorem 2.
If (QGPP0) deserves to be called a quantum general PP then it should
have the quantum special PP as a corollary. This is indeed the case.
Cor. Let Pr be a completely additive quantum probability mea-
sure on the projection lattice P(B(H)) where dim(H)  3. And
let  be any normal pure state such that Pr(S ) 6= 0. Then
Pr(E==S ) =  (E) for all E 2 P(B(H)). (QSPP)
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Proof: If Pr satises the hypotheses of Theorem 2 then so does Pr(==F ),
F 2 P(B(H)), provided that Pr(F ) 6= 0. So if Pr(S ) 6= 0 Theorem 2 implies
that for any ON basis fj'aig
Pr(E==S ) =
P
a
'a(E) Pr(S'a==S )
+
X
b 6=c
!0(S'bES'c)
where !0 is the normal state that extends Pr(E==S ). Choose the basis
fj'aig so that one of the basis vectors denes the normal pure state  . With
this choice the !0 term vanishes and
P
a
'a(E) Pr(S'a==S ) =  (E).
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5 Reections
1. The account of quantum chance. The account outlined above can be at-
tacked in multiple ways. The most head-on attack comes from the QBians
who want to do a de Finetti number on QM. Their basic tactic is a judo
move: the Gleason theorem which was used to prove the representation the-
orems (QGPP) and (QGPP0) can be used to support the view that quantum
states are simply bookkeeping devices used to represent and track the cre-
dence functions of Bayesian agents. For a skeptical assessment of QBians see
Earman (2019). Other philosophers of physics who are open to the idea of
objective chance will nd di¤erent faults with my account. Let the battles
begin. When the smoke clears one can hope that one or another result will
stand out: if the QBians are victorious then as far as QM goes the relation
between credence and chance is a non-topic; if the QBians are vanquished
and there emerges an account of quantum chance di¤erent and better than
the one on o¤er here, then see whether it can serve as a basis for proving the
desired representation theorems.
2. Why are chances induced by pure states and not by mixed states? The
answer has ve interrelated components. (i) The self-serving response is that
if PP serves as a functional characterization of chance then the probabilities
induced on P(B(H)) by mixed states on B(H) do not qualify as chances,
10A proof of the (QSPP) can also be obtained by combining Gleasons theorem with the
lter property of the support projection of a normal pure state.
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for they do not lend themselves to theorems such as (QSPP), (QGPP),
and (QGPP0). (ii) Whatever else chances are they are objective, observer-
independent probabilities. All observers attending the Yes-No measurement
of the support projection for a normal pure state  can agree when there is
a Yes answer and, thus, can agree that the state  has been prepared. The
probability values induced by  can be compared to the frequencies of out-
comes in repeated measurements when the system is repeatedly re-prepared
in the same initial state. The close match that is obtained in actual experi-
ments is evidence of the objective nature of the probabilities induced by pure
states. If mixed states did induce chances then we could not learn what the
chances are in the way we learn what the pure-state chances are by prepar-
ing the normal pure state by doing a Yes-No experiment and, if receiving a
Yes answer, by calculating the probabilities induced by said state. This is
because mixed states do not have lters (see Ruetsche and Earman 2020),
so there is no Yes-No measurement we can do for some element of P(B(H))
whose Yes outcome establishes that the mixed state  has been prepared.
The support projection S of an impure normal state does not distinguish
between  and a family of di¤erent mixed states (see Reection 3 below).
(iii) Whatever else chance is, it is non-epistemic probability. Consider the
mixed state  :=
1
2
 1 +
1
2
 2 where  1 and  2 are normal pure states cor-
responding to the orthogonal unit vectors j 1i and j 2i respectively. This
state can be created by programming a robot to ip a classical fair coin and
then prepare state  1 (respectively, state  2) if the coin lands Heads (respec-
tively, if the coin lands Tails). An agent who is told the robots procedure
but not the outcome of the coin ip will give an epistemic reading to the 1=2
mixture weights in the state . If, on the other hand, the agent is simply
presented with the mixed state  and not told how it has been prepared she
will not know how to identify the epistemic component of the probabilities
induced by , for  can be expressed in many ways as a mixture over di¤erent
pure states. But the stance adopted here is that the fact that there can be
an epistemic component is enough to disqualify  as inducing true chances.
The reader is reminded that the physics literature on quantum entanglement
takes a similar stance: a quantum state for a system is not counted as in-
ducing true quantum entanglement between the observables associated with
two subsystems if said state can be written as a mixture of unentangled
(= product) states. The motivation is similar: the mixture weights can be
given an epistemic interpretation, in which case the correlation between the
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subsystems is the result of the ignorance about which product state is the
actual one. Nor is this stance gainsaid by the fact that the mixture can be
written in di¤erent ways, as di¤erent mixtures over di¤erent product states.
(iv) A property often attributed to chance is that chances are irreducible
probabilities. One way to cash in this notion is that information specifying
the chances is maximally specic in the sense that there is no further infor-
mation compatible with said specication that changes the probabilities. In
the present context this feature is captured by the fact that the support pro-
jection S for a normal pure state  is a minimal in the projection lattice, i.e.
for any E 2 P(B(H)) if E  S (E implies S ) then E = S . (v) Finally,
the next section indicates why normal pure states are the receivers as well as
the givers of chances.
3. Other chances. The quantum representation theorems of Sec. 4 use
a family of mutually orthogonal normal pure states. But to contrast the
di¤erence between quantum and classical chance it is useful to consider the
chances that arise from non-orthogonal pure states. The support projection
S for normal pure state  on B(H) is the projection Ej i onto the ray
spanned by a vector j i 2 H corresponding to  . For normal pure states  
and  0 the expression  0(S ), giving the chances of a Yes answer to a Yes-
No measurement of S when performed on a system in state  
0 agrees with
the standard expression for transition probability from  0 to  :  0(S ) =
 0(Ej i) = h 0jEj ij 0i = h 0jE2j ij 0i = jjEj ij 0ijj2 = jh 0j ij2. Of course,
when j i and j 0i are orthogonal the transition probability is atly zero.
Here it is worth noting that two di¤erent senses of quantum incompati-
bility for elements of the projection lattice P(B(H)) in general, and for the
support projections S and S 0 for normal pure states in particular, can be
distinguished: the rst is that S and S 0 are orthogonal, which holds i¤
S S 0 = S 0S = 0, implying transition probabilities  
0(S ) and  (S 0)
are both 0. The second is that S and S 0 are non-commuting, S S 0 6=
S 0S , in which case quantum doctrine declares that co-determination (or co-
measurability) is impossible; in this case the transition probabilities  0(S )
and  (S 0) are non-zero. Transition probabilities for non-orthogonal normal
pure states deserve to be numbered as a kind of quantum chance.
In the classical case the abelian event structure means that there is no
analog of the second sense of quantum compatibility and, hence, no corre-
sponding notion of transition probability for classical chances. This a con-
clusion that can also be reached by conjuring with the notation philosophers
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use and applying the classical (SPP). For any credence function Cr obeying
the axioms of classical probability we have that for any chance function ch0
such that Cr(Cch0) 6= 0, Cr(Cch=Cch0) = Cr(CchCch0)
Cr(Cch0)
= 0 when ch0 6= ch
since then Cch and Cch0 are logically incompatible. But the (SPP) says
that Bayes conditionalizing on Cch0 is supposed to bring rational credence
in line with ch0-chances so that Cr(Cch=Cch0) = ch0(Cch), with the upshot
that ch0(Cch) = 0 whenever ch 6= ch0 (as long as there is a credence function
such that Cr(Cch0) 6= 0). This blocks the obvious route to non-trivial transi-
tion probabilities in the classical setting.11 The lack of a notion of transition
probability in the classical setting should not be surprising if the only classi-
cal chances are the 0  1, a conclusion that can be derived from the abelian
structure of classical events (see Reection 7 below).
Finally, although the expression  (S') is mathematically well-dened for
any normal states  and ' it would be untoward to try to interpret it as a
transition probability from  to ' when ' is impure. This is a consequence of
the fact noted above that there are no lters for impure states. To illustrate
the problem consider the impure state ' = 11 + 22 where 1 and 2 are
orthogonal vector states and 1 + 2 = 1, 0 < 1; 2 < 1. The support
projection S' for this state is the projection onto the subspace spanned by
the vectors corresponding to 1 and 2. Thus,  (S') does not distinguish
between the transition from  to ' vs. the transition to any other impure
state ' = 11 + 22 with 1 + 2 = 1, 0 < 1; 2 < 1, and 1 6= 1 and
2 6= 2. It is a normal pure state that giveth chance, and it is a normal pure
state that receiveth transition chances.
There are undoubtedly other senses of quantum chance worth studying.
My program is does not exclude them but is committed to the stance that
they are best studied within the framework outlined above.
4. What goes wrong when dim(H) = 2? When dim(H) = 2 Gleasons
theorem fails and there are quantum probability measures on P(B(H)) that
11Another way to reach this conclusion: For any normal pure state  ,  (S ) = 1.
Philosophers call the classical analog for their imagined chance functions the condition
that chances are not self-undermining,viz. ch(Cch) = 1 for any chance function ch. In
classical probability calculus this condition implies that that ch(Cch0) = 0 when ch 6= ch0
since then Cch and Cch0 are logically incompatible. The non-self-undermining nature of
classical chance is a consequence of the (SPP): Cr(Cch=Cch) = 1 if Cr(Cch) 6= 0, and by
(SPP) Cr(Cch=Cch) = ch(Cch). In the quantum case the non-self-undermining nature of
chances does not preclude non-zero transition probabilities.
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do not extend to any state on B(H) and, as a result, they cannot be rep-
resented as weighted averages of objective chances in the way required by
the desired representation theorem. So do we conclude that here the PP
fails? This would be too hasty. Recall that what we want to show if that
if a Pr satises the norms of normative Bayesianism then a representation
of Pr as epistemic uncertainty about chance values is a theorem of the the-
ory of quantum chance. The synchronic norm of normative Bayesianism is
satised since Pr is nitely additive for dim(H) = 2. But what about the
diachronic norm? Recall: When Pr extends to the state  and Pr(F ) 6= 0
Lüders conditionalization is given by Pr(E==F ) :=
!(FEF )
!(F )
=
!(FEF )
Pr(F )
.
The numerator cannot be written as Pr(EFE) since when E and F do not
commute, EFE =2 P(B(H)) and no Pr value is assigned to EFE. So when
Pr does not extend to a state onB(H) Lüders conditionaliztion is undened.
Should this be described by saying that the diachronic norm is moot for such
a Pr, or should we say that such a Pr fails the norm?
The reason that in the dim(H) = 2 case there are probability measures
on P(B(H)) that fail to extend to a state on B(H) is that such measures
are not continuous in the strong or weak operator topology on the unit ball,
which they would have to be if they were induced by a normal state, all states
being normal for dim(H) = 2. Perhaps such continuity of credence functions
on P(B(H)) can be justied as a norm of rationality. But that remains to
be seen; none of the familiar Bayesian rationales seem to do the job.
5. The additivity requirement. When H is an innite dimensional separa-
ble space the representation theorems require that Pr is countably additive.
Some, but not all, of the justications for nite additivity as a rationality
constraint can be extended to cover countable additivity. There are, however
probabilists including de Finetti and his heirs who insist that anything be-
yond nite additivity is not justied as a rationality constraint, and for them
Theorems 1 and 2 do not vindicate a quantum PP. When H is non-separable
the theorems require that Pr is completely additive, and some of the justi-
cations for this requirement are fraught (see Skyrms 1992 for a hitch in using
a Dutch book argument to justify complete additivity). But for probability
measures on P(B(H)) countable additivity su¢ ces for all practical purposes
since a countably additive Pr is completely additive unless dim(H) is as great
as the least measurable cardinal (see Eilers and Horst 1975). There are no
known applications of QM that require such high dimensional Hilbert spaces.
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6. Beyond ordinary QM. What are the prospects for the desired represen-
tation theorem when the algebra of observables is more exotic than B(H)?
Gleasons theorem can be extended to cover much more general von Neumann
algebras than the plain vanilla B(H) of ordinary QM. But these more exotic
algebras have features that raise tricky issues about the nature of quantum
chance, e.g. the Type III von Neumann algebras encountered in relativistic
QFT admit no normal pure states. Such issues will have to be discussed
elsewhere (see Earman and Ruetsche 2020 for some pertinent remarks).
7. Classical chance. What are the prospects of carrying out for classical
probability the program illustrated above for quantum probability? They
are either excellent or dismal depending on your account of classical chance.
They will seem excellent if you belong to the venerable, but much criticized,
school that says the only genuine classical chances are the degenerate ones,
i.e. those that assign 0   1 probabilities to all events, all other probability
measures expressing epistemic uncertainty about the exact state of the sys-
tem which confers 0  1 probabilities. This result can be obtained from the
above apparatus by viewing classical probability as concerned with the spe-
cial case where the von Neumann algebra is abelian and, thus, the projection
lattice is a Boolean lattice. Any pure state on such an abelian von Neumann
algebra induces 0  1 measures on its Boolean projection lattice. The above
representation theorems apply, the only di¤erences being that in the Boolean
case the chances  a(E) in both Theorem 1 and 2 are always 0 or 1 and the
!-term in Theorem 2 is always 0.
For those who nd repugnant the use of Hilbert space apparatus to treat
classical probability there is a way to shed some of the trappings of Hilbert
space and make connections with the more familiar nomenclature of classical
probability. It begins with the Gelfand-Naimark theorem which shows that
an abelian von Neumann algebra is -isomorphic to C(X), the algebra of
continuous functions on a compact Hausdor¤ space X, the sum and product
of functions being dened pointwise.12 The projections P(C(X)) form a
Boolean algebra, and for any pure state  on C(X), (f) 2 f0; 1g for all
f 2 P(C(X)). Further if  is a pure state then there is a unique x 2 X
such that (f) = f(x) so that pure states can be identied with points
of X or the extreme point-measures on X. An element f 2 P(C(X)) is
the characteristic function {Y of a subset Y  X, and for a pure state ,
12I.e. (f + g)(x) = f(x) + g(x) and (fg)(x) = f(x)g(x) for f; g 2 C(X) and x 2 X.
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({Y ) = {Y (x) = 1 if x 2 Y and 0 if not.13 Borel probability measures
on X are mixtures of these extreme point-measures, each of which induces
classical chances of 0  1.
Needless to say, some philosophers will reject this account of classical
chance. I urge them to develop their alternative account of classical chance
and to use it to prove representation theorems of the kind studied above.
6 Twisted knickers
The analytical metaphysicians who write about PP get their knickers twisted
about a number of issues. I will comment on two of them.
1. Admissible evidence. Recall the opening example of coin ipping and
the ...regardless of other information you may haveclause. The idea is that
information of the objective chance of Heads trumps other information you
may have about the behavior of the coin, including information about the
frequency of Heads in past ips. But exactly which information is trumped
and why? There is a wrangle about this in the philosophical literature not
surprising since the discussion takes place in the absence of a substantive
theory of chance. Given the account of quantum chance on o¤er the answer
is straightforward. If the other information is already incorporated in
the agents credence function Pr then unless Pr(S ) = 0 for the support
projection for a normal pure state  , the information that the proposition S 
is true and, hence, that the chances are those induced by  trumps the other
informationsince then Pr(E==S ) =  (E) for all E 2 P(B(H)). If on the
other hand the other information that F 2 P(B(H)) is true is acquired
at the same time as the information that S is true then standard quantum
doctrine takes over, at least if the information is acquired by measurement.
For standard doctrine says that F and S are simultaneously measurable i¤
they commute. And if Pr(S F ) = Pr(FS ) 6= 0 then FS = S F 6= 0. But
since S is a minimal projection FS = S F = S , so again S trumps and
Pr(E==S F ) = Pr(E==FS ) = Pr(E==S ) =  (E) for all F 2 P(B(H))
such that Pr(S F ) = Pr(FS ) 6= 0.
This has implications for what philosophers gave dubbed the New Prin-
cipal Principle for classical probability (see Hall 1994 and Thau 1994) a rival
to the formulation of the classical PP mentioned above:
13({Y {Y )(x) = {Y (x){Y (x) = {Y (x) for x 2 X and Y  X.
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If Cr is a rational credence function then for all chance func-
tions ch and all E and F in the domains of Cr and ch such that
Cr(CchE) 6= 0 and ch(CchE) 6= 0
Cr(E=CchF ) = ch(E=CchF ). (NPP)
To nd the analog of (NPP) in quantum probability take the analog of the
rhs of (NPP) to be Pr (E==S F ) where as usual  is a normal pure state
with S its support projection, and Pr is the quantum probability measure
on P(B(H)) induced by  . Thus, the quantum analog of (NPP) becomes:
for all F 2 P(B(H)) such that Pr(S F ) = Pr(FS ) 6= 0
Pr(E==S F ) = Pr (E==S F ). (QNPP)
Given the results of the preceding paragraph the (QNPP) reduces to an
identity of quantum probability.
2. Humean supervenience and undermining. In discussing the relation of
credence and chance David Lewis climbed aboard another of his hobby horses,
Humeanism (see Lewis 1994). A Humean world is one devoid of all of the
hidden springs, powers, and potentialities Hume found so distasteful; at base
it is world consisting of prosaic local particular facts this electron now has
spin up, that electron had spin down 10 Secs. ago, etc. and anything that is
true in such a world must supervene on the Humean basis of such facts. But
how can such a world accommodate objective chance which smacks of non-
Humean powers? If chances supervened on actual frequencies of measurement
outcomes all might seem to be well for Humeanism. But what if the actual
frequencies diverge wildly from what would be expected from the alleged
chance values? This is unlikely in a long sequence of iid trials, and measure
zero in the limit of an innite sequence of iid trials. But it is still possible,
and the very possibility seems to undermine Humean supervenience. The
quick answer is that on the present account of quantum chance, chances do
not supervene on relative frequencies; they supervene on the truth makers of
the support projections of normal pure states. If adding these truth makers
to the supervenience base makes the world non-Humean then a quantum
world is non-Humean, and the Humean hobby horse has to be sent to the
quantum knackers. Relative frequencies can, nevertheless, serve as epistemic
underminers in that they can lead one to doubt the attribution of a pure
state to a system and, thus, to doubt that the chances calculated from said
state are the actual chances.
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7 Conclusion
The program I have recommended for understanding the relation between
credence and quantum chance can be described as an exercise in naturalized
metaphysics metaphysics transmuted into the meta-physics, the enterprise
of interpreting theories of physics. The conclusions it draws about the nature
of quantum chance and its relation to rational credence are every bit as
fragile and problematic as the interpretational principles it employs very
fragile and problematic, especially so since quantum theory has so many
hotly debated interpretations. So it is worth noting that independently of the
metaphysics and meta-physics the representation results derived above have
a remarkable feature when coupled with the ability to do Yes-No experiments
for the elements of the projection lattice.
Suppose that a Yes-No experiment is performed on the support projection
S for a normal pure state  , and suppose that all the agents who witness
the experiment agree that the outcome of the experiment is a Yes answer.
The subset of those agents whose prior probability for S is non-zero will nd
that when they update their credence function by Lüders conditionization on
S they agree on their posterior credences for every element of the projec-
tion lattice, no matter how otherwise divergent their prior credences were.
And this is quite independent of whether learning S is parsed as learning
that the objective chances are those induced by  or whether the learning
is given some less metaphysically loaded reading. The remaining subset of
agents who assigned atly zero prior credence to S will be in a quandary
about what their new credences should be since Lüders updating, like its
classical counterpart of Bayes conditionalization, is undened for zero prob-
ability events. But if they resolve their quandary by agreeing that their new
credence functions should assign credence 1 to S then they too will nd that
their new credences align perfectly with all of their fellow Bayesian agents,
for Prnew(S ) = 1 implies that Prnew(E) =  (E) for all F 2 P(B(H)). Call
it chance or call it by another name, the thing that lies behind this coup de
foudre merger of opinion deserves to be studied more carefully.
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